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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
GOLDEN KEY REALTY, INC. 
and W. PETER BRANDLEY, 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
P. J. MANTAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19083 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by a real estate broker to recover a 
real estate commission. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury on a special interrogatory 
verdict. The jury in answering the special interrogatories 
found that the broker had used reasonable efforts in selling 
the subject property, but found that there had been an accord 
Jnd satisfaction wherein the broker had agreed to accept a re-
duction in his commission. Notwithstanding the special ver-
diet, the Court, upon motion of respondent, granted judgment 
roe the full commission. The trial court refused, however, to 
award respondent costs, prejudgment interest, or attorney's 
fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent has cross appealed seeking costs, interest 
attorney's fees. Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the 
trial court affirmed, subject to a modification for the addi-
tion of interest and attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts fails in total to comply 
with Rule 75(p), Utah Rules of Civil Procedurel. For this 
reason, respondents desire to restate the facts in a proper and 
accurate manner. 
Respondent, Golden Key Realty, Inc., is a Utah corporatioo 
engaged in the business of selling real estate. Respondent, 
Peter Brandley, is a licensed real estate broker of eleven 
years, licensed for himself and for Golden Key Realty 
(R-2,8,254). (Hereafter, respondents will jointly be referred 
to as "Brandley"). 
Appellant Mantas was the owner of real property at 7774 
West 2400 South in Salt Lake County, where he operated a used 
truck and used truck parts business (R-145). Mantas became 
acquainted with Brandley as a result of a sale of property th;' 
1 Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure providesf 
that the appellant• s brief shall contain a concise statement '.'. 
the material facts of case citing pages of the record supporl· 
such statement. Appellant's brief makes no citation at all 
the record. 
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had made from Mantas' brother's estate (R-146). As a 
result of that transaction, Mantas asked Brandley if he would 
sell Mantas' business property (R-146). This request ultimately 
resulted in the execution of a standard real estate listing 
agreement (R-146). The listing agreement required the broker to 
use reasonable efforts to find a purchaser; established a list-
ing price of $330,000.00; and obligated the owner to pay a 6% 
commission if the property were sold within the six month list-
ing period (Exhibit P-1). 
After obtaining the listing, Brandley made efforts to sell 
the property. These efforts consisted of listing the property 
on the multiple listing exchange, having the effect of making 
the property known to approximately 2500 real estate brokers 
(R-255); sending approximately 800 letters to prospective busi-
ness purchasers in Salt Lake, Provo, Ogden, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco and Phoenix (R-255,256,257); advertising the property 
in the Wall Street Journal and local papers (R-257); and con-
tacting other brokers (R-235). These efforts resulted in the 
obtaining of several offers, none of which ever closed because 
they were either unacceptable to the owner, or because the buyer 
couldn't qualify for financing (R-91,257). 
During the period of time that the listing was in effect, 
Mantas sold the property to a Mr. Lan England for $300,000.00 
IR-147). Mantas bypassed the broker in making this sale and 
"laimed that England was not a buyer that had been found as a 
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result of the broker's efforts. 
After the sale to Lan England, Brandley demanded payment 
his commission. Two oral conversations took place where this 
subject was discussed. The first was a conversation at Mantas' 
place of business wherein Mantas claimed that Brandley agreed 
accept $5,000.00 to satisfy the commission claim (R-179); 
Brandley denied that any such agreement was made, but 
that various figures were "batted arour;id" and the parties agrw 
to meet the next day at Dee's Family Restaurant and try to 
finalize an agreement (R-259). The parties did in fact meet,, 
following day at Dee's Restaurant and the following is Mantas' 
version of the conversation that took place (R-193): 
Q. (By Mr. West): But, in any event, there was some 
conversation about settlement and -- was the meeting by 
ment the next day? 
A. (By Mr. Mantas): Yes, sir. 
Q. And then, what? You came over to Dee's cafe and met' 
A. We agreed on the price --
Q. Well, did you meet at Dee's? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you have breakfast together there or something. 
A. No, sir, we just stopped in and had a drink and 
Q. How long did that whole conversation take place whi 
you were there at Dee's Family Restaurant? 
A. Probably half an hour. 
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Q. So you sat there in -- did you sit down at a booth? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you sat a half hour and talked about some way of 
rPsolving the settlement, is that right? 
A. Yes, for his money. 
Q. Now, that was the time you handed him a check for 
$2,SOO, was it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you had written something on the back of the check, 
something about being 
A. Balance due. I wrote a small contract between myself 
and him. 
Q. You wrote that on the back of the check? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, isn't it true that at that time, that right there 
in Dee's cafe, he said to you, Mr. Mantas, I don't think that 
this is fair? 
A. After he took the check and had the check in his hand. 
Q. Then he says, I don't think this is fair. Is that we 
he said? 
A. He said words -- something like, I don't think this is 
fair. don't recollect exactly the words, but he says, I will 
llin1e to see an attorney about it. 
Q. Yes, he said something to the substance and effect 
"nar, I don't think this is fair and I'm going to see my attor-
ney about it? 
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A. After he had the check in his hand. 
Q. After you handed him the piece of paper, the checK' 
A. He read the back of the check. 
Q. And he took the check and said, I don't think it's 
fair, I'm going to go see my attorney about it? Is that what 
happened? 
A. The best I recollect, yes. He took the check from m; 
hand. I says, Here it is, there's a small contract. He alsc 
stated at the time -- he was assured tnat he would get the 
balance of his agreed upon and I told him that on the 
back of the check I wrote a little contract binding it. I says 
I have also taken a picture of the check. 
Q. That's what you wrote on the check? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you handed him the check when he made this comment 
about not thinking this was fair and he wanted to go see his 
attorney? 
MR. HALL: I object. I've let this go on quite a bit and 
MR. WEST: I think the evidence is in and I won't pursue 
any further, counsel. 
Q. (By Mr. West) Then after that, the check was given 
back to you, was it not? 
A. The check was mailed back to me. 
Q. The check has never to this day ever been cashed? 
- 6 -
A. No, sir. 
Q. And there's never been any tender by you of any $5,000 
or any other amount other than the check that you gave him? 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, I don't believe the witness can re-
spond adequately to the legal term "tender". 
Q. (By Mr. West) I'm not using the legal term of tender. 
You have never given him any other checks other than that 
one $2,500 check that was returned? 
A. No, I never gave him any other check, no, sir. 
(The check referred to above was introduced in evidence as Exhi-
bit P-6) . 
Brandley's version of what took place at Dee's Family 
Restaurant was substantially similar to Mantas' testimony. 
Brandley testifed as follows (R-260): 
Q. (By Mr. West) Would you state what you said and what 
Mr. Mantas said when you had the conversation down at Dee's 
Family Restaurant. 
A. (By Mr. Brandley) Well, Mr. Mantas mentioned this 
$5,000 and I told him I didn't think that was enough. Then he 
said, Well, that's all you're going to get. Then he gave me 
this check for $2,500, $2,500 to come in 90 days. I said, Pete, 
1 rlon't like this, I'm going to take this to my attorney. 
Q. was there any more said in the conversation? 
A. No. 
Q. And then you left and he left. 
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A. That's right. 
Based upon the above, the jury in its special inter raga• 
verdict found that there had been an accord and satisfaction 
( R-38). 
The Court thereafter entered judgment on the verdict 
(R-91). Brandley moved to alter and amend the judgment, seeK: 
the full commission, interest, costs and attorney's fees 
(R-88) .2 Judge Daniels granted the motion in part, holding rn 
effect that there cannot as a matter of law be an oral modif1· 
cation of a contract required by the statute of frauds to be i' 
writing (R-105). Brandley was awarded judgment of $18,000, 
being 6% of the sale price of the property (R-105). The tria: 
judge refused to make an award to Brandley of prejudgment inte: 
est, attorney's fees or costs (R-105). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED THE BROKER JUDGMENT 
FOR HIS FULL COMMISSION 
A. There Can Be No Oral Modification of a Contract 
Required by the Statute of Frauds to be in Wr1t1ng. 
It was undisputed in this action that the property was s•, 
during the listing period. Utah law is clearly to the effect 
that a broker is entitled to a commission where the property 
2 Brandley had previously made a motion for a directed ver· 
diet based upon the statute of frauds and other grounds. Tf'" 
reporter's transcript, however, contains nothing beyond the 
testimony of the witnesses and is not complete. The motion 
directed verdict was denied at that time. 
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by the owner during the listing period. Cheney v. Rucker, 
I" Utah 2d 205, 351 P.2d 86 (1963); Strout v. Broderick, 522 
P.2d 144 (Utah 1974); Taylor National, Inc. v. Jensen Brothers 
Construction Company, 641 P.2d 150 (Utah 1982). 
It is also clear that any agreement authorizing or employ-
ing a broker to sell real estate is required by the statute of 
frauds to be in writing.3 This being so, it follows that 
there can be no oral modification of a written agreement re-
quired by the statue of frauds to be in writing. Strevell 
Paterson v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 (Utah 1982); Zions Properties 
v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975); Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 
2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970); Combined Metals v. Bastian, 71 Utah 
535, 267 Pac. 1020 (1928). The most recent pronouncement of 
this basic legal principle was made only last year in Strevell 
Paterson v. Francis, supra, and was concurred in by all member 
of the present court. There it was stated: 
"By the same token, the release or revocation of an 
agreement to answer for the debt of another must 
also be in writing. It is well settled that if an 
original agreement is within the Statute of Frauds, 
any subsequent agreement which alters or amends it 
must also satisfy the requirements of the statute. 
(Authorities cited). The alleged oral release 
obviously does not meet those requirements of en-
forcibility. Neither does defendant allege or prove 
any acts done in reliance on or as part performance 
of the oral release that would remove it from the 
operation of the statute. Therefore, the existence 
or nonexistence of an oral release does not consti-
tute a genuine issue of material fact, and the trial 
court correctly held that plaintiff was entitled to 
judgment on this issue as a matter of law". 
§25-5-4(5), Utah Code Annotated. 
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The language of Strevell-Paterson specifically refers to 
releases, revocations, alterations or amendments of a written 
contract. Combined Metals v. Bastian, supra, also includes the 
term modification. To say that an accord and satisfaction does 
not involve a release, revocation, or modification of an 
existing contract is to ignore the very definition of that tern 
An accord and satisfaction is an agreement between two persoM, 
one of whom has a right against the other, that the latter 
should do or give, and the former accept, something in 
satisfaction of the right of action different from, and usually 
less than, what might be legally enforced. BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 4th Edition, 1951. In other words, there must be an 
original contract to be revoked, released or modified before 
there can even be an accord and satisfaction. Furthermore, 
there is no logical reason why an accord and satisfaction shouk 
be exempted from the operation of the rule. The very purpose of 
the Statute of Frauds is to prevent unfounded and fraudulent 
claims. Williston on Contracts, 3rd Edition, §448. If there 
were ever a case where the Statute of Frauds ought to apply it 
is a case like the instant case where the oral agreement is 
denied by the party to be charged, and the evidence in support 
thereof was at best suspicious. 
B. There was No Accord and Satisfaction In This Case. 
Appellant has argued that an accord and satisfaction 
operates as a new agreement and for some unexplained reason 
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should be exempt from the operation of the rule requiring 
modification of Statute of Fraud contracts to be writing. But 
even appellant concedes that the rule would apply if there were 
no accord and satisfaction. 
The trial judge in the instant case used the language 
dccord and satisfaction in his instructions to the jury and in 
the jury verdict form. Although this terminology was used, the 
undisputed evidence supports the conclusion that there was never 
technically an accord and satisfaction, but only an accord if 
appellant's evidence is believea.4 The rule is universally 
accepted (except where the new agreement itself is accepted as a 
satisfaction) that a mere executory accord, without satisfac-
tion, constitute no bar to the enforcement of the original 
claim. 1 AM. JUR.2d, Accord and Satisfaction, §47. Under the 
facts of the instant case, the alleged promise itself to accept 
a lesser sum could not have been accepted as a satisfaction.5 
The evidence was undisputed that the full $5,000 which Mantas 
claimed that the broker agreed to accept was never paid or 
tendered. Thus, there was never any completed accord and 
satisfaction, and appellant's entire argument fails. 
See Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 
1383 (Utah 1977) explaining that an accord is the agreement and 
the satisfaction is the execution or performance of such 
agreement. 
See §419 Restatement of Contracts stating in effect that 
the substituted performance must be of a different nature (that 
is something other than payment in cash) in order for the 
Promise itself to be a satisfaction. 
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C. None Of Appellant's Authorities Are In Point. 
None of the authorities cited by apFellant supports 
conclusion that the trial court committed error. Four Utah 
cases are cited in appellant's brief. These cases discuss 
generally the legal principles of accord and satisfaction, but 
none of the cases discuss the Statute of Frauds, nor do any of 
them involve contracts required by the Statute of Frauds to 
in writing. None of the Utah cases are in point. 
Appellant cites as his strongest authority the case of 
Gaido v. Tysdal, 235 P.2d 741 (Wyo. 1951). Gaido involved the 
parol discharge of a contract for the sale of land. The case.· 
readily distinguishable in that Gaido performed to the letter 
and in full his obligation under the oral agreement of the 
parties, and the vendor had sold the land to another. The Cour· 
correctly noted that the Statute of Frauds has no application 
where there has been full and complete performance of the 
contract by one of the contracting parties. The language and 
authority in Gaido to the effect that written contracts within 
the Statute of Frauds may be the subject of an oral accord 
satisfaction is really nothing more than an application of the 
doctrine of part performance. Gaido is not substantially 
different from Cutright v. Union Savings & Investment Company, 
33 Utah 486, 94 Pac. 984 (1908) where the Utah court reached 
similar decision in connection with an oral rescission of a 
contract for the sale of land. But the Utah Court 
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carefully noted in its decision that if the parol agreement is 
wholly executory, it is within the Statute of Frauds and could 
not be enforced any more than any other oral agreement concern-
ing an interest in real estate. These authorities clearly sup-
port repondents' position that an executory promise to pay a 
lesser amount is still within the Statute of Frauds. 
D. There Was No Consideration For an Accord and Satisfaction 
It was undisputed in this case that the alleged accord 
agreement took place after Mantas sold the property and was 
already indebted to the broker for an $18,000 real estate com-
mission. In Sugarhouse Finance Company v. Anderon, 610 P.2d 
1369 (Utah 1980), the Court stated: 
"Where, however, the underlying claim is liquidated 
and certain as to amount, separate consideration must 
be found to support the accord; otherwise, the obli-
gor binds himself to nothing he was not already 
obligated to do, and the obligees promise to accept 
a substitue performance is unenforceable". 
While it is true that settlement of a disputed claim may 
constitute sufficient consideration6, it is difficult to 
determine from the facts of this case any legitimate good faith 
dispute. Mantas claimed that Brandley was not entitled to a 
commission because he failed to use reasonable efforts to sell 
the property. Yet the uncontradicted testimony presented at 
trial showed that the efforts of Brandley were very substantial. 
Jnder these circumstances, the Court could easily find as a 
Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383 
I Utah 1977). 
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matter of law that the alleged accord and satisfaction 
lacked consideration. 
E. There Has Been No Part Performance To Take the Case 
Out of The Statute of Frauds. 
Appellant's evidence was to the effect that he handed the 
broker a check for $2, 500 representing one-half of the alleged 
agreed upon amount; that the broker took it saying that he die 
not think this amount was fair and that he was going to see hE 
attorney about it; and that the checll: was thereafter returned, 
uncashed, by the broker's attorney. These facts were not in 
dispute, and it is respondents' position that they cannot as 
a matter of law constitute a basis for part performance. 
§30A-3-802, Utah Code Annotated (Uniform Comercial Code) 
provides in effect that the mere giving of a check (unless a 
bank is the drawer of the check) does not discharge the 
obligation for which it is given, but merely suspends the 
obligation until the check is honored. Thus, by statute, the 
uncashed check cannot be considered as payment. 7 
Moreover, aside from the Uniform Commercial Code, it is 
clear that the mere taking physical possession of a check does 
not constitute payment of the debt where the creditor does 
nothing indicating his intention to receive the check as 
7 In addition, there was no evidence presented at trial tha 1 
the check would be good. Inasmuch as payment is an affirmatl,' 
defense, it would seem that there was a failure on the part rt 
respondent to meet his burden of proof. 
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cayment. 8 This would be true whether or not the check was 
returned, but in the instant case the check was returned. To 
say that the broker accepted the check as payment, is to ignore 
the undisputed evidence. 
But even if the Court were to ignore the Uniform Commercial 
Code, and ignore the common law of payment, the appellant still 
couldn't prevail because payment alone is not generally 
considered sufficient to take a case out of the Statute of 
Frauds. The general law covering this subject is summarized at 
73 AM. JUR. 2d, Statute of Frauds, §463, where it is stated: 
"The courts of most jurisdictions hold that the mere 
payment of a portion of the purchase money, un-
acompanied by any other act or exceptional cir-
cumstance, does not amount to part performance of 
an oral land contract sufficient to take the case 
out of the Statute of Frauds ..• Accordingly, it 
is now the general rule in most jurisidictions that 
the mere payment of the purchase money by the 
purchaser of land, without other acts, is not 
sufficient as an act of part performance •.• The 
reason often given for the rule that payment alone 
is not sufficient is that the plaintiff is con-
sidered as having a sufficient remedy at law to 
recover back the money, it being considered that 
since he has performed in no respect other than 
the payment of money, there is a definite and 
certain standard for estimating his damages •.• 
The rule has sometimes been stated that payment 
of the consideration without more, is not a 
sufficient part performance, where its recovery 
in an action at law would fully indemnify the 
purchaser". 
Thus, to constitute part performance, there must be payment 
coupled with something else such as taking possession, putting 
i11 improvements or some similar action. Most of the cases and 
60 AM. JUR. 2d, Payment, §46. 
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authorities on this subject deal with contracts for the sale 
land, but the same principles would apply to other contracts 
required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing. 
POINT I I 
THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE ISSUE REGARDING QUESTIONS 
TAKEN FROM THE JURY 
Appellant claims at Point II of his brief that the trial 
court committed error in refusing to instruct the jury on issue 
of fraud, conspiracy or breach of fid\,lciary duty. There are nc 
references to any part of the record as to what facts are beinc 
claimed, and no specific facts are documented or even alleged. 
It is improper to make blanket assertions and then leave it to 
court, or to the respondents, to ferret out evidence from the 
record in support of or in opposition to said assertions. 
Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8 Utah 2d 293, 
333 P.2d 1061 (1959). The sufficiency or insufficiency of 
evidence to support a ruling by the trial court should not be 
considered on appeal in the absence of references to the recor: 
and transcript as to where the testimony can be found. 
v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947). 
In the absence of anything more than appellant's sweepiM 
statements, respondents cannot consider appellant's Point II i: 
a legitimate issue on appeal. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD RESPONDENTS 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
Respondents have cross-appealed and claim that the trlL 
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:ourt erred in not awarding prejudgment interest, attorney's 
fees and costs. These three items will be considered 
separately. 
A. Interest. §15-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 
provides that the legal rate of interest on the forebearance of 
any money, goods or things in action shall be 10% per annum. 
Prejudgment interest is recoverable in any action where the loss 
is fixed as of a particular time and the loss can be calculated 
with mathematical accuracy. Jorgensen v. John Clay & Company, 
660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983); Anderson v. State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Company, 583 P.2d 101 (Utah 1978). 
Respondent is unaware of any case which leaves it up to the 
trial court as to whether to award or not to award prejudgment 
interest. Indeed, it has been stated to the contrary in Lignell 
v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979) as follows: 
"In contract cases, certainly, interest on amounts 
found to be due in judicial proceedings is recovery 
to which the creditor is entitled as a matter of 
law". 
See also Anderson v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 
supra, where the refusal to award prejudgment interest was part 
of the basis for a reversal. This is not a matter that is 
discretionary with the trial court and respondents are clearly 
entitled to an award of prejudgment interest. 
B. Attorney's Fees. The listing agreement, which was the 
subject of this action, provided as follows (Exhibit P-1): 
"In case of the employment of an attorney to enforce 
any of the terms of this agreement, I agree to pay 
a reasonable attorney's fee and all costs of collec-
tion". 
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Respondents presented evidence, whicn was unchallenged, 
that reasonable attorney's fees had been incurred in the amc. 
of $3,220.009. In spite of the contract between the parties, 
and the undisputed evidence before the Court, the trial Judg' 
refused to award attorney's fees. 
In Utah, attorney's fees are recoverable when provided' 
by statute or contract. Biesinger v. Behunin, 584 P.2d 801 
(Utah 1978); Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977). The 
amount of attorney's fees to be awarded· a prevailing party is 
generally within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Turtle Management Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667 (Ut, 
1982). However, it is clearly an abuse of discretion to awar: 
nothing, where the contract for the payment of fees and the 
reasonable amount thereof are not in dispute. 
entitled to an award of attorney's fees. 
Respondents ars 
C. Attorney's Fees on Appeal. Not only are respondents 
entitled to attorney's fees incurred in the court below, they 
are also entitled to an additional award of attorney's fees f,; 
the appeal. Early Utah cases held that attorney's fees on 
appeal were discretionary with the Appellate Court. The earl 
decisions were expressly overruled in the recent case of 
Management Services v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406 
(Utah 1980) where the Court state as follows: 
9 See Supplemental Stipulated Record. 
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"The parties here agree to pay reasonable attorney's 
fees if it became necessary to enforce the contract. 
If plaintiff is required to defend its position on 
appeal at its own expense, plaintiff's rights under 
the contract are thereby diminished. We therefore 
adopt the rule of law that a provision for payment 
of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's 
fees incurred by the prevailing party on appeal 
as well as at trial, if the action is brought to 
enforce the contract, and overrule Swain and Downey 
State Bank on this point insofar as they may be to 
the contrary". 
See also Centurian Corporation v. Cripps, 624 P.2d 706 {Utah 
1981) • 
D. Costs. Rule 54{d){l), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that costs shall be awarded as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the Court otherwise directs. Although 
this rule leaves room for discretion in the trial court, it does 
not address the issue of awarding costs where the parties have a 
written contract covering this item. It would seem that the 
very same arguments that the Court raised in Management Services 
v. Development Associates, supra, to allow attorney's fees on 
appeal as a matter of right where the payment of attorney's fees 
is a subject of contract would equally apply to a contractual 
provision covering the payment of costs. The appellant in his 
written listing agreement agreed to pay both attorney's fees and 
costs. Respondents are therefore entitled to be awarded the 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as cited 
it is respectfully urged that the judgment of the trial 
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court be affirmed insofar as it relates to the principal am0 ,,,. 
of the judgment. 
Upon remand, however, the trial court should be directed:· 
accordance with respondents' cross-appeal to modify the judgmen: 
by including therein an award for interest, attorney's fees, 
attorney's fees on appeal and costs. 
- 20 -
Respectfully submitted, 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
DAVID E. WEST 
1300 Walker Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondents 
